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REJECTING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS UNDER SECTION 1113 OF
CHAPTER 11 OF THE 1984 BANKRUPTCY
CODE: RESOLVING THE TENSION BETWEEN
LABOR LAW AND BANKRUPTCY LAW
Daniel S. Ehrenberg*
When a corporation files a petition under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, it attempts to reorganize and rehabilitate itself.
The corporation attempts to work out various consensual arrange-
ments with its creditors and is required to submit a feasible plan of
reorganization to a bankruptcy court for approval. At times, the
company seeks to reject its collective bargaining agreements. The
circumstances under which a company is allowed to reject its
collective bargaining agreements are extremely controversial. They
are controversial because any rejection may adversely impact the
employment relationship of thousands of employees and the
surrounding community.
This article will explore the interaction between bankruptcy law
and labor law. Specifically, it will examine the circumstances under
which a debtor-in-possession in Chapter 11 can reject a collective
bargaining agreement under § 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code. The
first part of this article will describe the tension which appears to
exist between labor law and bankruptcy law. The article will show
that the goals and purposes of these two comprehensive bodies of
federal law can result in conflict. The second part of this article
will recite the decisions by various courts leading up to, and
including, the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Bildisco and
Bildisco.' In so doing, this article will articulate the differing
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standards used by courts to allow debtors to unilaterally reject or
modify collective bargaining agreements, and the Supreme Court's
attempt to interject uniformity in this area. The third part of the
article will depict Congress's reaction to the Supreme Court's
decision in Bildisco of passing § 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code as
part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984. This part will also briefly describe the provisions of § 1113.
The fourth part of this article will show how courts have construed
§ 1113 and developed varying interpretations of this section as a
result of Congress' poor and ambiguous draftsmanship. The fifth
and final part of this paper will discuss the policy issues behind the
unilateral rejection of collective bargaining agreements and will
attempt to develop a standard for the application of § 1113 that
will reconcile the competing interests of bankruptcy law and labor
law.
In developing a workable standard, courts need to realize their
limited role in being able to settle labor disputes. Therefore, courts
should encourage good faith bargaining and negotiations between
labor and management, so that a mutually acceptable agreement is
reached based on each side's economic power. If courts interject
themselves into a labor dispute by either failing to recognize and
account for each side's economic power or attempting to tilt that
balance artificially in favor of one side, the results can be disas-
trous. An erroneous court decision to allow a contract to be
rejected can lead to a strike by the union and/or a prolongation of
the bankruptcy process that will increase the deadweight bankrupt-
cy costs to society.
I. TENSION BETWEEN LABOR LAW AND BANKRUPTCY LAW
Both labor law and bankruptcy law are comprehensive bodies
of federal law. Being federal laws, they seek uniformity of
application and override the conflicting laws of the 50 states.2 Yet,
a statutory tension exists between the goals and purposes of each
2 THOMAS R. HAGGARD AND MARK S. PULLIAM, CONFLICrS BETWEEN
LABOR LEGISLATION AND BANKRUPTCY LAW 4 (1987) [hereinafter HAGGARD &
PULLIAM].
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of these laws. These tensions can collide when a debtor' under a
Chapter 114 reorganization attempts to unilaterally reject or modify
a collective bargaining agreement.
Labor relations between employers and labor unions are
regulated by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as per the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).5 The NLRA, enacted to
promote industrial peace, states: "It is hereby declared to be the
policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred
by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
ing." The main goals of the NLRA are: to protect employees'
rights to engage in or not to engage in union activities, including
the right of the majority of the employees of an appropriate
bargaining unit to select a union as their exclusive bargaining
representative; to require employers to bargain in good faith with
the employees' authorized representative (the union) before acting
unilaterally on subjects that affect the wages, hours and conditions
of the employees' work; to enforce collective bargaining agree-
ments reached as a result of negotiations between unions and
employers; to prohibit unfair labor practices by employers and
unions; and to disfavor strikes and promote negotiations as the
principal method of resolving labor disputes.7
3 The term "debtor" will be used throughout this paper to refer to the debtor-
company after a petition for Chapter 11 reorganization has been filed and will
also include the trustee of the debtor's business. This party is usually referred to
as the "debtor-in possession."
4 Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code regulates corporate reorganizations and
is located at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1988). This paper will refer primarily to
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
5 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988). The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
was enacted as the Wagner Act in 1935, and amended by the Taft-Hartley Act
in 1947 and the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959. The National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) was created by the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1988).
6 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
7 See HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 2, at 4-5.
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Under § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, it is illegal for an employer "to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his
employees."8 While not having a duty to agree, an employer must
bargain to "impasse" before making any change in the terms and
conditions of employment and in a collective bargaining agree-
ment.9 Specifically, § 8(d) forbids an employer from rejecting or
modifying any terms of a collective bargaining agreement before
expiration without obtaining the union's consent.10 Therefore,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). Specifically, the NLRA states that a refusal to
bargain collectively by the employer is an unfair labor practice. An "unfair labor
practice" is a specific violation of various provisions of the NLRA. By
committing an unfair labor practice, an employer (or a union) can be sanctioned
by the NLRB and required to remedy the situation.
9 An "impasse" is "a state of facts in which the parties, despite the best of
faith, are simply deadlocked." NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc, 318 F.2d 472, 482 (5th
Cir. 1963). See generally Peter Guyan Earle, The Impasse Doctrine, 64 CHI.
KENT L. REv. 407, 411-26 (1988) (discussing factors related to determination
whether an impasse exists); Terrence H. Murphy, Impasse and the Duty to
Bargain in Good Faith, 39 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1977) (same) Comment, Impasse
in Collective Bargaining, 44 Thx. L. REv. 769, 776-82 (1966) (same).
10 The pertinent portions of § 8(d) state:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the perfor-
mance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative
of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of
a concession: Provided, that where there is in effect a collective-
bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting
commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party
to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the
party desiring such termination or modification-
(1) serves written notice upon the other party to the
contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days
prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event such
contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the
time it is proposed to make such termination or modification;
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under the NLRA, it would be illegal for a company to unilaterally
reject or modify any terms of a collective bargaining agreement
while that agreement is still in force.
The primary purpose of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is
to permit a debtor, under court supervision, to rehabilitate and
reorganize its business, by allowing a debtor to relieve itself of the
burden of oppressive debt and begin with a fresh start. An essential
part of the reorganization process is the ability of the debtor to
discharge existing obligations, including accrued debts and
executory contracts.1' Bankruptcy law prefers that this reorgani-
zation occur in a consensual manner whereby the debtor reaches an
agreement with its creditors as to the most appropriate manner to
(2) offer to meet and confer with the other party for
the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a contract
containing the proposed modifications;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service within thirty days after such notice of the existence of
a dispute.. .; and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting
to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the
existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is
given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever
occurs later.
The duties imposed upon employers, employees, and labor
organizations by paragraphs (2),(3), and (4). . . shall not be
construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any
modifications of the terms and conditions contained in a
contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become
effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened
under the provisions of the contract.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
"See HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 2, at 5. See also, Carlos J. Cuevas,
Necessary Modifications and Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Search for
the Substantive Standard for Modification of a Collective Bargaining Agreement
in a Corporate Reorganization, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 133-38; Judith D.
Nichols, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors:
The Necessity Requirement Under Section 1113, 21 GA. L. REv. 967, 973-75
(1987).
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rehabilitate the company. 12 The rationale behind reorganization is
to prevent economic waste because "assets that are used for
production in the industry for which they were designed are more
valuable than those same assets sold for scrap. 13
Specifically, under § 365(a),14 a debtor is allowed to reject any
executory contracts or unexpired leases to which it is a party and
is protected, under § 362(a),"5 from any proceedings to collect,
assess or recover any claims that arose before the debtor filed for
reorganization. Therefore, a collective bargaining agreement, being
an executory contract, may be rejected unilaterally by a debtor
under a Chapter 11 proceeding.16
The ability to reject a collective bargaining agreement contra-
dicts the provisions of the NLRA, thereby creating a major conflict
between these two major pieces of federal legislation:
Labor law generally favors stability of the collective-
bargaining relationship and generally disfavors unilateral
actions by employers. Bankruptcy law, on the other hand,
often contemplates a radical alteration of existing business
relationships and permits changes whether other affected
parties consent or not. Whereas labor law attempts to strike
a somewhat neutral balance between the rights of employers
and the rights of employees, bankruptcy unquestionably
1" Brian J. Beck, Marlene B. Hanson, B. Douglas Hayes & Kevin M.
Judiscak, Comment, Bankruptcy Law-The Standard for Rejecting Collective
Bargaining Agreements in Bankruptcy: Labor Discovers It Ain't "Necessarily"
So, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 79 n.1 (1988)[hereinafter Beck, Hanson, Hayes &
Judiscak].
13 H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6179.
14 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).
'- 11 U.S.C. 362(a) (1988).
16 The Supreme Court in Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 522-23, determined that a
collective bargaining agreement was an executory contract and, therefore, could
be rejected by a debtor under § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
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favors debtors over creditors. And although labor law
affords unions certain privileges and immunities that are not
enjoyed by others in the business community, bankruptcy
law generally disfavors the special or unequal treatment of
creditors. 7
II. STANDARDS USED BY COURTS TO ALLOW THE REJECTION OF
A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT UP TO, AND INCLUD-
ING, THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN NLRB v. Bildisco
AND Bildisco
A. The Differing Standards of the Circuits before Bildisco
While all courts have recognized that a debtor can unilaterally
reject a collective bargaining agreement under § 365(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code, the circuit courts have differed as to what
standard should be applied to allow rejection in a Chapter 11
proceeding. Under § 365(a), a debtor could reject an executory
contract if it was a burden to the estate, while, under § 8(d) of the
NLRA, a collective bargaining agreement could not unilaterally be
rejected or modified.18 Some courts attempted to treat labor
contracts differently from other executory contracts by making it
17 HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 2, at 5-6. For example, labor
organizations, including unions, are generally exempted from coverage under
federal antitrust laws because of Congress's enactments of sections 6 and 20 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988) and 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1988), and the
Norris La-Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 et. seq. (1988). See United States v.
Hutchinson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). For more information regarding labor's
exemption from the scope of the antitrust laws, see generally Edward B. Miller,
Antitrust Laws and Employee Relations (1984) (describing the labor exemption
of the antitrust laws while focusing on employer concerns); ABA COMMITTEE
REPORTER, ANTITRUST AND LABOR RELATIONS LAW, 405 (1992) (updating case
law dealing with antitrust and labor law); Daniel J. Gifford, Redefining the
Antitrust Labor Exemption, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1379 (1988) (providing an
overview of and arguing for a narrowing of the exception only to apply to
collective bargaining agreements that do not involve unions that control the
industry or oligopolistic-structured industries).
S Bruce H. Chamov, The Uses and Misuses of the Legislative History of
Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 40 SYRACUSE L. REv. 925, 931-32 (1989).
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more difficult for a debtor to reject these type of contracts. Yet,
other courts argued that a labor contract should be treated the same
as any other executory contract.
The courts developed three different standards for allowing the
unilateral rejection of a collective bargaining agreement in a
Chapter 11 proceeding. Each standard reflected a different balanc-
ing of the policies of the NLRA and the Bankruptcy Code.
The first standard, the business judgment test, was delineated
in In re Klaber Bros.1 9 The court treated a collective bargaining
agreement as any other executory contract and allowed the debtor
to reject the contract, under the traditional standard of rejection of
executory contracts, by determining if the contract is a "burden on
the estate."20 Under the business judgment test, a debtor has only
to show that rejection of the executory contract will benefit the
estate, regardless of whether the contract is burdensome in any
other manner or if rejection is economically unjustified.2 ' The
Klaber Bros. court held that there was no difference between
NLRA-governed collective bargaining agreements and other
commercial contracts, that the language of the Bankruptcy Act did
not conflict with the NLRA, and that once a debtor has filed under
the Bankruptcy Act, the NLRA has no jurisdiction over the
debtor's actions. 22 In effect, the court decided that the Bankruptcy
Act took precedence over the NLRA.23
The second standard, the balancing of the equities test, was
"9 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Rejection in Klaber Bros. was allowed
under § 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, the equivalent predecessor to § 365(a).
20 Id. at 85.
21 HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 2, at 19. See also Nichols, supra note
11, at 980 (describing the business judgment test as one in which "directors of
a corporation needed only to exercise their duties with loyalty and due care in
order to be protected from personal liability for honest mistakes of judgment").
22Mark S. Pulliam, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements
Under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 14 (1984).
Charnov, supra note 18, at 935.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
adopted by the Second Circuit in Shopman's Local 455 v. Kevin
Steel Prods., I1C.2 4 The court realized that a collective bargaining
agreement was different than other commercial executory contracts
and attempted to reconcile the conflict between the NLRA and the
Bankruptcy Act. Arguing that a decision to permit rejection should
not be based solely on "the financial status of the debtor," the court
espoused the following test, permitting rejection:
Only after thorough scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the
equities on both sides, for, in relieving a debtor from its
obligations under a collective bargaining agreement, it may
be depriving the employees affected of their seniority,
welfare, and pension rights, as well as other valuable
benefits which are incapable of forming the basis of a
provable claim for money.25
The Kevin Steel court created a three-part test which included an
examination of the motivation for the bankruptcy, proof of financial
difficulty of the debtor to justify a proceeding in bankruptcy, a
showing that rejection would bring beneficial results and a
balancing of equities concerning the benefits derived from contract
rejection compared to the loss of intangible employee rights. By
rejecting the business judgment test, the Kevin Steel court interject-
ed a great degree of uncertainty in the law because the balancing
of equities test cannot be specifically defined.26
In Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks v.
REA Express, Inc.,27 the Second Circuit adopted a strict standard
for rejection of collective bargaining agreements that has been
referred to as the "failure of the business" or survival test.28 Under
24 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975)
5Id. at 707.
26 See HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 2, at 33.
27 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017.
Chamov, supra note 18, at 938.
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this test, rejection of a collective bargaining agreement would only
be allowed, "[w]here, after careful weighing of all of the factors
and equities involved, including the interests sought to be protected
by the ... [debtor], a district court concludes that an onerous and
burdensome executory collective bargaining agreement will thwart
efforts to save a failing [company] in bankruptcy from collapse. ' 29
The court continued by stating that, "in view of the serious effects
which rejection has on the carrier's employees it should be
authorized only where it clearly appears to be the lesser of two
evils and that, unless the agreement is rejected, the carrier will
collapse and the employees will no longer have their jobs.""' The
REA Express standard, requiring the debtor to prove that liquidation
would occur unless rejection of its collective bargaining agreements
is allowed, was seen as an extremely pro-labor test.
31
Most court decisions followed one of these three standards.3 2
Because of these differing standards, a lack of uniformity devel-
oped between the various circuits as to the rejection of collective
bargaining agreements. As a result, the Supreme Court attempted
to define the proper standard and create uniformity.
B. The Supreme Court's Decision in NLRB v. Bildisco and
Bildisco: An Attempt to Unify the Circuits
In Bildisco, the Supreme Court answered the following two
questions:
9 Id. at 169.
30 Id. at 172.
3' Nichols, supra note 11, at 980.
32 See, e.g., In re Brada-Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1983)
(applying the Kevin Steel balancing of the equities standard and rejecting REA
Express); In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir. 1982) (same), affg, 465 U.S. 513
(1984); Local Joint Executive Bd., AFL-CIO v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 613 F.2d 210
(9th Cir. 1980) (applying a business judgment test); Truck Drivers Local Union
No. 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976) (applying a quasi-REA
Express standard), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978).
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(1) [U]nder what conditions can a Bankruptcy Court permit
a debtor-in-possession to reject a collective-bargaining
agreement; (2) may the National Labor Relations Board
find a debtor-in-possession guilty of an unfair labor practice
for unilaterally terminating or modifying a collective
bargaining agreement before rejection of that agreement has
been approved by the Bankruptcy Court.
Under the first question, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that
§ 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allowed rejection of collective
bargaining agreements, basing their decision on the fact that none
of the parties denied that a collective bargaining agreement was an
executory contract and that Congress had not expressly exempted
collective bargaining agreements from the scope of § 365.34 The
Court also unanimously ruled that the Kevin Steel balancing of the
equities test was the proper standard under which a debtor could
reject a collective bargaining agreement. 35
The Court recognized that a collective bargaining agreement
was different than a commercial executory contract because of its
status in this country's national labor policies and thereby required
greater protection than would be afforded under the business
judgment test. 6 Yet, the Court also realized that the standard
enunciated in REA Express was too strict and was, "fundamentally
at odds with the policies of flexibility and equity built into Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code. '37 Emphasizing that a bankruptcy
court must focus on the goals of Chapter 11 -- namely, the
rehabilitation of a distressed enterprise -- the Court adopted the
balancing of the equities test. In announcing this test, Justice
Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, stated that the following factors
33 Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 516.
34 Id. at 522-23.
35 Id. at 526-27.
36 Id. at 524.
31 Id. at 525.
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
need to be taken into account before a collective bargaining
agreement can be rejected:
The Bankruptcy Court must make a reasoned finding on the
record why it has determined that rejection should be
permitted. Determining what would constitute a successful
rehabilitation involves balancing the interests of the affected
parties -- the debtor, creditors, and employees. The Bank-
ruptcy Court must consider the likelihood and consequences
of liquidation for the debtor absent rejection, the reduced
value of the creditors' claims that would follow from
affirmance and the hardship that would impose on them,
and the impact of rejection on the employees. In striking
the balance, the Bankruptcy Court must consider not only
the degree of hardship faced by each party, but also any
qualitative difference between the types of hardship each
may face.38
The Court also stressed that, before authorizing rejection, the
Bankruptcy Court must be convinced that the debtor has made
reasonable efforts to negotiate voluntary modifications with the
union.39
Under the second question, the Court, by a five to four vote,
ruled that a debtor did not commit an unfair labor practice by
unilaterally rejecting a collective bargaining agreement, although its
rejection had not been approved by the bankruptcy court.' The
majority reasoned that a debtor's filing of a Chapter 11 petition
made its contracts unenforceable and allowed modifications of
contracts and property by virtue of law. Therefore, § 8(d) of the
NLRA would not apply because the contract is already unenforce-
able as per the bankruptcy laws.a' In making its ruling, the Court
39 Id. at 527.
39 Id. at 526.
'0 Id. at 533-34.
'4 Id. at 532-33.
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declared that the Bankruptcy Code took precedence over the
policies of the NLRA.42
Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued that bankruptcy and labor
policies would be better reconciled if the debtor was required to
seek prior authorization from the bankruptcy court before rejecting
a collective bargaining agreement.43 He reasoned that unilateral
rejection and modifications of collective bargaining agreements
prior to bankruptcy court approval would discourage interim
negotiations and would lead to increased labor strife, which could
hinder the debtor's reorganization."
While the Supreme Court unanimously and noncontroversially
ruled that a debtor could reject a collective bargaining agreement
under the balancing of the equities test, the second part of the
decision, which allowed a debtor to unilaterally and without prior
bankruptcy court approval reject such an agreement, created a
storm of protest from organized labor and Congress. The Supreme
Court's decision left employees without,"any significant procedural
protection regarding the rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement.145
II. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO Bildisco: THE PASSAGE
OF SECTION 1113
Congress reacted immediately to the Court's decision in
Bildisco. They were already considering bankruptcy legislation
because of the jurisdictional crisis created by the Supreme Court's
decision in Northern Pipeline.' Congressman Rodino, Chairman
42 Id. at 527.
4 Id. at 535-53 (Brennan J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
44 Id. at 548-49.
41 Cuevas, supra note 11, at 161.
46 Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50 (1982), held that Congress' grant of jurisdiction to non-article III judges to
resolve all bankruptcy and bankruptcy-related matters pursuant to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1878 violated article III of the Constitution. See also, Cuevas,
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of the House Judiciary Committee, introduced a bill that would
have completely overturned Bildisco by disallowing unilateral
rejection of a labor contract without bankruptcy court approval
under the REA Express standard.4 7
Senators Packwood and Thurmond both introduced different
proposals in the Senate. Thurmond's proposal would have incorpo-
rated the Bildisco decision and the balancing of the equities test
into the new Bankruptcy Code, and would have allowed a thirty-
day waiting period from the time of filing a motion by the debtor
to reject a collective bargaining agreement with the bankruptcy
court in order to give the court the opportunity to hold a hearing
concerning rejection." Packwood's proposal would have required
the debtor to propose the minimum modifications to enable a
successful reorganization, provide the union with the information
necessary to evaluate the proposal, require reasonable attempts at
negotiation, allow an expedited hearing and decision by the
bankruptcy court, and have this proposal apply retroactively.4 9
A debate ensued as to which proposal should be enacted.
Because of the need to quickly enact a Bankruptcy Code to allow
the bankruptcy courts to continue to function, a compromise was
agreed on which differed from each of the proposals that had
previously been introduced. On June 29, 1984, Congress enacted
supra note 11, at 162-63 (discussing the Northern Pipeline crisis).
'7 Id. at 946-47.
48 Joseph L. Cosetti and Stanley A. Kirshenbaum, Rejecting Collective
Bargaining Agreements Under Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code-Judicial
Precision or Economic Reality?, 26 DUQ. L. REv. 181, 191 (1987).
49 Id. The reason that Packwood's proposal was to apply retroactively was
so that it would apply to the Continental Airlines Bankruptcy which had been
filed by Frank Lorenzo in September, 1983. See In re Continental Airlines Corp.,
50 Bankr. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1985). During that bankruptcy, Continental used its
bankruptcy status to unilaterally reject its collective bargaining agreements with
its unions and hired non-unionized replacement workers at 50% pay-cuts. See,
e.g., Douglas B. Feaver, Continental Airlines Is Struck; Most Flights Continue
Operating, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1983, at A3; Business News: Dateline Houston,
Reuters, Sept. 30, 1983, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARC-NWS File.
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the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984,5o which was later signed into law by President Reagan.
Included within those amendments was § 1113, 5' the proposal
50 Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
51 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1988). Section 1113 states:
(a) The debtor in possession, or the trustee if one has been appointed
under the provisions of this chapter, other than a trustee in a case
covered by subchapter IV of this chapter and by title I of the Railway
Labor Act, may assume or reject a collective bargaining agreement only
in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b)(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application
seeking rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor in
possession or trustee (hereinafter in this section 'trustee' shall include
a debtor in possession), shall-
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative
of the employees covered by such agreement, based
on the most complete and reliable information avail-
able at the time of such proposal, which provides for
those modifications in the employees benefits and
protections that are necessary to permit the reor-
ganization of the debtor and assures that all creditors,
the debtor and all of the affected parties are treated
fairly and equitably; and
(B) provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the represen-
tative of the employees with such relevant information
as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a
proposal provided for in paragraph (1) and ending on the date of the
hearing provided for in subsection (d)(1), the trustee shall meet, at
reasonable times, with the authorized representative to confer in good
faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of such
agreement.
(c) The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement only if the court finds that-
(1) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a
proposal that fulfills the requirements of subsection
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(b)(1);
(2) the authorized representative of the employees has
refused to accept such proposal without good cause;
and
(3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection
of such agreement.
(d)(1) Upon the filing of an application for rejection the court shall
schedule a hearing to be held not later than fourteen days after the date
of the filing of the application. All interested parties may appear and be
heard at such hearing. Adequate notice shall be provided to such parties
at least ten days before the date of such hearing. The court may extend
the time for the commencement of such hearing for a period not
exceeding seven days where the circumstances of the case, and the
interests of justice require such extension, or for additional periods of
time to which the trustee and the representative agree.
(2) The court shall rule on such application for rejection within thirty
days after the date of the commencement of the hearing. In the interests
of justice, the court may extend such time for ruling for such additional
time as the trustee and the employees' representative may agree to. If
the court does not rule on such application within thirty days after the
date of the commencement of the hearing, or within such additional
time as the trustee and the employees' representative may agree to, the
trustee may terminate or alter any provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement pending the ruling of the court on such application.
(3) the court may enter such protective orders, consistent with the
need of the authorized representative of the employee to evaluate the
trustee's proposal and the application for rejection, as may be necessary
to prevent disclosure of information provided to such representative
where such disclosure could compromise the position of the debtor with
respect to its competitors in the industry in which it is engaged.
(e) If during a period when the collective bargaining agreement
continues in effect, and if essential to the continuation of the debtor's
business, or in order to avoid irreparable damage to the estate, the court
after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to implement
interim changes in the terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules
provided by a collective bargaining agreement. Any hearing under this
paragraph shall be scheduled in accordance with the needs of the
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concerning the rejection of collective bargaining agreements.
Unfortunately, the compromise was reached in a joint conference
committee that did not produce a conference report. As a result, no
definitive legislative history exists and legislative intent can only
be inferred from inconsistent statements by various Congress-
persons contained in the Congressional Record. 2
Section 1113 details the procedural and substantive require-
ments a debtor must fulfill before a bankruptcy court will approve
a petition for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement.
Subsequent to the filing of a petition and prior to filing an
application to reject a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor
must propose "those necessary modifications in the employees
benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the reorgani-
zation of the debtor."53 The proposal must "assure[ ] that all cred-
itors, the debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and
equitably."54 The debtor must also provide the union with "such
relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal." 55
After making the proposal, the debtor must "meet, at reasonable
times" with the union and bargain "in good faith in attempting to
reach mutually satisfactory modifications of such agreement."56
trustee. The implementation of such interim changes shall not render the
application for rejection moot.
(1) No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a trustee to
unilaterally terminate or alter any provision of a collective bargaining
agreement prior to compliance with the provisions of this section.
II U.S.C. § 1113 (1988).
52 Charnov, supra note 18, at 954; Cosetti, supra note 48, at 193.
53 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A).
54 Id.
55 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(B).
56 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(2).
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The union may not reject the proposal "without good cause."57
After making a satisfactory proposal which complies with sub-
section (b)(1), conferring with the union, and having the union
reject it without good cause, the court must "find[ ] that the
balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement"
in order for the rejection to be approved.58 The bankruptcy court
is to schedule a hearing on the debtor's proposed application within
fourteen days after the application has been filed and is to rule on
the application within thirty days, unless certain circumstances
occur or both parties agree to a postponement. 59 A debtor may
also obtain interim relief to modify a collective bargaining
agreement if it can demonstrate that such relief is "essential" to
prevent the estate from suffering "irreparable damage."' Section
1113 prohibits a debtor from "unilaterally terminat[ing] or alter[ing]
any provisions of a collective bargaining agreement prior to
compl[ying] with [its] provisions."'"
The procedural requirements of § 1113 are relatively straight-
forward and overturn that part of Bildisco which allowed a debtor
to unilaterally reject a collective bargaining agreement without
obtaining bankruptcy court approval. 62 Under § 1113, the only
time that a debtor can unilaterally reject an agreement is when the
bankruptcy court fails either to rule on an application within thirty
days or postpones the ruling on an application in accordance with
its statutory mandate.63
Yet, the substantive standards lack clarity and show the
57 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(2).
58 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c).
59 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d).
60 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e).
61 11 U.S.C. § 1113(f).
62 Cosetti, supra note 48, at 192-93.
63 Nichols, supra note 11, at 987.
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unskillful manner in which the amendment was drafted.64 Terms,
such as "necessary," "good faith," "fairly and equitably," and "good
cause" are not defined in the statute.65 Section 1113 is riddled
with ambiguity as to its proper meaning and has, therefore, become
a nightmare to interpret.'
In construing a statute, the Supreme Court has suggested that
where the language of the statute is "plain," no duty of interpre-
tation arises. 67 If the statute is ambiguous, one can resort to a
statute's legislative history. But, the Supreme Court usually relies
upon a committee report as the "authoritative source for finding the
Legislature's intent ... [because it] ... represents the considered
and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in
drafting and studying proposed legislation. ' 68 In contrast, the
Supreme Court generally refuses to rely on the comments of
various Congressional members or casual statements made during
floor debates.69
Since § 1113's legislative history is merely composed of
contradictory statements made by various Congressional members,
it will be difficult to use legislative history as a guide to interpret-
64 Cosetti, supra note 48, at 182, 193.
65 Id.
66 See, e.g., HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 2, at 76-121; Cuevas, supra
note 11, at 166-88; Chamov, supra note 18, at 956-1002; Nichols, supra note 11,
at 988-1001; Cosetti, sutpra note 48, at 193-220. See also infi'a notes 71-107 and
accompanying text.
67 See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("[w]here the
language [of the statute] is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the
duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful
meanings need no discussion.").
68 Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (quoting Zuber v. Allen,
396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)).
69 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982); Consumer
Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968).
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ing the statute's true meaning." Yet, the courts have availed
themselves of the Congressional Record and the specific wording
of the statute to interpret the ambiguities within § 1113. As a
result, § 1113 has been interpreted in an inconsistent manner by the
various circuits.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 1113:
INCONSISTENT APPROACHES
Given the ambiguity of various terms within § 1113 and the
lack of authoritative legislative history, it comes as no surprise that
various courts have developed differing interpretations of the
section's meaning. This part of the paper will briefly detail the
major court decisions interpreting § 1113. In doing so, it will
illustrate the problems inherent in attempting to interpret the statute
and will lay the framework for the policy discussion in the next
section.
One of the earlier decisions to construe § 1113 was In re
American Provision Company.71 The bankruptcy court denied a
debtor's motion to reject an executory contract because the debtor
had only met once with the union to discuss the proposal, the
projected savings from rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement only amounted to two percent of the company's total
monthly expenses, and the agreement was due to expire in eight
months. While noting that § 1113 was "not a masterpiece of
draftsmanship," the judge distilled nine elements from that
provision under which the debtor bears the burden of persuasion by
a preponderance of the evidence:
1. The debtor in possession must make a proposal to the
union to modify the collective bargaining agreement.
2. The proposal must be based on the most complete and
reliable information available at the time of the proposal.
3. The proposed modifications must be necessary to permit
70 Cosetti, supra note 48, at 193.
71 44 B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
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the reorganization of the debtor.
4. The proposed modifications must assure that all creditors,
the debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and
equitably.
5. The debtor must provide to the union such relevant
information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.
6. Between the time of the making of the proposal and the
time of the hearing on approval of the rejection of the existing
collective bargaining agreement, the debtor must meet at
reasonable times with the union.
7. At the meetings the debtor must confer in good faith in
attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of the
collective bargaining agreement.
8. The union must have refused to accept the proposal without
good cause.
9. The balance of the equities must clearly favor rejection of
the collective bargaining agreement.7'
These nine elements have been employed by the majority of courts
as the basis for determining whether a debtor has met the require-
ments under § 1113 for rejecting a collective bargaining agree-
ment.73
72 Id. at 909 (footnotes omitted).
73 See, e.g., In re Sun Glo Co., Inc., 144 B.R. 58 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1992)
(applying nine-point American Provision test to deny rejection of collective
bargaining agreement); In re Valley Steel Products Co., Inc., 142 B.R. 337
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992) (applying same to allow rejection of collective
bargaining agreement); Matter of GCI, Inc., 131 B.R. 685 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1991) (applying same to deny rejection); In re Express Freight Lines, Inc, 119
B.R. 1006 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1990) (applying same to deny rejection); In re Big
Sky Transp. Co., 104 B.R. 333 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989) (applying same to allow
rejection); Matter of Sol-Sieff Produce Co., 82 B.R. 787 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988)
(applying same to allow rejection); In re Texas Sheet Metals, Inc., 90 B.R. 260
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988) (applying same to allow rejection); Matter of Walway
Co., 69 B.R. 967 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (applying same to allow rejection).
See also HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 2, at 89.
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Another early decision, In re Allied Delivery Systems,74
construed the term "necessary" in "necessary modifications" to be
less stringent than "essential" to avoid liquidation. The bankruptcy
court in this case authorized the debtor to reject a collective
bargaining agreement although the debtor and the union had met
only twice to discuss the proposal before the court held its hearing
on the motion to reject, the debtor proposed a greater reduction of
wages and benefits' for union employees than for non-union
employees and the contract was due to expire within six weeks.
The court first reasoned that Congress had adopted a more
rigorous standard for interim, as opposed to permanent, relief.
Because the word "essential" was in the interim relief section of
the statute, the word "necessary" must have a less stringent
meaning.' The court also held that:
[I]n the context of this statute 'necessary' must be read as
a term of lesser degree than 'essential.' To find otherwise,
would be to render the subsequent requirement of good
faith negotiations, which the statute requires must take place
after the making of the original proposal and prior to the
date of the hearing, meaningless, since the debtor would
thereby be subject to a finding that any substantial lessening
of the demands made in the original proposal proves that
the original proposal's modifications were not
'necessary. '
The court noted that the company was in dire financial straits. The
company's direct labor costs attributable to the debtor's union
employees were 87 percent of the its gross revenues. Therefore, the
debtor's proposal was necessary. 77 The court held that the balanc-
ing of the equities favored rejection because the debtor was in dire
74 49 B.R. 700 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).




financial distress, and reduction of labor costs was the only way the
debtor could reorganize.78 The court also determined that "fair and
equitable" does not mean that all employees' wages have to be
reduced by the same percentage. Of significance to the court was
the fact that the wages of the non-union employees were less than
the wages and benefits of the union employees and that the non-
union employees did not have a pension plan.79 The court stated:
"[flair and equitable does not of necessity mean identical or equal
treatment."8° The Allied Delivery System court interpreted § 1113
as allowing a debtor flexibility to reorganize its business.
The Third Circuit was the first appellate court to interpret §
1113 in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of
America.8' In reversing the district court's affirmance of the
bankruptcy court's decision to allow the debtor to reject its
collective bargaining agreement, the court focused on two issues.
The court inquired into: (a) the necessity of the proposed modifi-
cations -- the "how necessary" inquiry; and (b) the objective of the
modifications -- the "necessary to what" inquiry.82 Under the first
inquiry, the court held that a bankruptcy court should permit only
essential, minimum modifications to the collective bargaining
agreement and construed the term "necessary" to mean "es-
sential. ' 83 Under the second inquiry, the court determined that the
objective of the modifications should be the short-term goal of
preventing liquidation of the debtor, rather than the overall long-
78 Id. at 704.
79 Id. at 702-03.
0 Id. at 703.
81 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986).
82 Id. at 1088.
83 Id.
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term goal of Chapter 11 of restoring financial health to the
debtor.8
4
Wheeling-Pittsburgh was the seventh largest steelmaker in the
United States when it filed for bankruptcy in 1985. Relations with
its union were poor. It had modernized its facilities in the 1970s
and became heavily indebted in the process. As a result of a
recession and increased foreign competition, the company lost
money in 1982 through 1984. Because of its debt, the company
was forced to seek concessions from its unions, creditors and
shareholders. The union had given concessions to the company on
three different occasions, reducing its wages from the industry
average of $25 per hour to a low of $18.60, with gradual resto-
ration to $21.40 per hour by the end of 1984. When the company
asked for a fourth round of concessions, the union refused until
Wheeling-Pittsburgh had extracted concessions from its lenders.
The lenders had not made any concessions up to that point. The
company negotiated with the lenders and the union, but could not
convince either party to compromise on the issue of pledging its
current assets to the banks. The lenders wanted those assets
pledged in return for concessions, while the Steelworkers feared
that if those assets were pledged and the economy went bad, there
would be no life-preserver and the company would go under. While
the company was willing to give into the lenders' demands, the
union lost confidence in the management's good faith and refused
to budge. Consequently, Wheeling-Pittsburgh filed for relief under
Chapter 11 on April 16, 1985. On May 9, 1985, the company made
a proposal to the union to modify the collective bargaining
agreement by agreeing to a five-year contract term, a maximum
labor cost of $15.20 per hour, elimination of profit-sharing,
reduction of medical and insurance benefits, and cut-backs on a
variety of other fringe benefits. After negotiations broke down over
the issue of requested financial information, Wheeling-Pittsburgh
applied to the bankruptcy court to reject the collective bargaining
agreement. The bankruptcy court granted the application and
Wheeling-Pittsburgh began to institute unilateral changes.
84 Id. at 1088-89. See also, Beck, Hanson, Hayes & Judiscak, supra note 12,
at 88.
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Immediately thereafter, on July 21, 1985, the union struck. It took
an eighty-seven day strike for the parties to reach a tentative agree-
ment, which occurred while the case was still pending before the
Third Circuit.85
Rather than determine that the case was moot, the Third Circuit
rendered a decision.86 The court determined that "necessary"
meant "essential" by relying on the legislative history of the statute
and determining that the Packwood proposal was the one that
Congress ultimately adopted.87 While acknowledging that "essen-
tial" appeared in the interim relief section of § 1113, the court did
not place any significance on that fact. The court labelled the
argument -- that "necessary" had a different meaning than "essen-
tial" because the words appeared in two different subsections --
"hyper-technical." 88
Again relying on legislative history, the court interpreted the
phrase "necessary to permit reorganization of the debtor"89 as
being concerned only with the short-term goal of preventing the
debtor's liquidation. 90 The court based its answer on Congress'
intent and stated that Congress had meant to emphasize the
immediate future, rather than the long-term future of the debtor.
Based upon this interpretation of the statute, the Third Circuit
determined that the Wheeling-Pittsburgh proposal had not met the
standard for rejection. The court specifically noted that the absence
of a "snap-back" provision, whereby the union could share in the
company's profits if business rebounded, made the proposal unfair
85 Id. at 1076-80.
86 Cosetti, supra note 48, at 208.
87 791 F.2d at 1088. See also Cosetti, supra note 48, at 210-11 (discussing
the Third Circuit's misplaced reliance on legislative history).
88 791 F.2d at 1089.
89 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (1988).
90 791 F.2d at 1090.
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and inequitable.9' In effect, the Third Circuit applied a strict
standard to determine if a debtor could reject a collective bargain-
ing agreement. Furthermore, the standard was based on the court's
view of legislative history.
In contrast to the Wheeling-Pittsburgh court, the Second Circuit
in Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation, Inc.9
construed § 1113 in a more flexible and less stringent manner. The
Carey court held that "necessary" modifications need not be
restricted to those that are absolutely "essential" or minimal, and
that "reorganization" refers to the long-term financial viability of
the debtor, rather than the short-term goal of preventing the
debtor's liquidation.9
3
Carey Transportation, Inc. was a bus company that operated a
shuttle between New York airports and New York City. The
company had incurred large annual losses from 1982 to 1985. To
stem its losses, it successfully obtained concessions from Local
807, the union representing its mechanics and its creditors. While
obtaining some concessions from the union, it was not able to
negotiate adequate concessions. Carey filed for Chapter 11 and
made a proposal to Local 807 to modify its collective bargaining
agreement. The union refused to accept any more changes and
declined to enter into further negotiations. Carey filed a petition to
reject its contract with Local 807 under §'1113. The bankruptcy
court granted the petition and the district court affirmed its
decision.94
The Second Circuit disagreed with the Third Circuit's holding
in Wheeling-Pittsburgh that "necessary" meant "essential" or the
"bare minimum." The court examined the legislative history and
determined that Congress had refused to adopt the Packwood
proposal of "minimum modifications" and, instead, had substituted
91 Id.
' 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
93Id. at 90. See also Beck, Hanson, Hayes & Judiscak, supra note 12, at 91.
9 Id. at 85-87.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
the term "necessary." 5 The court also adopted the reasoning of
the Allied Delivery court and held that the essential modifications
standard adopted by the Third Circuit in Wheeling-Pittsburgh
would place the debtor in an untenable position because if the
debtor only proposed the absolute minimum changes, it would not
be able to bargain in good faith. 96 Therefore, the court determined
that Congress must have intended that the debtor be able to
propose changes greater than the bare minimum, as long as those
changes were made in good faith.97 The court also held that the
term "essential" in the interim relief subsection is not synonymous
with the term "necessary" in the permanent relief section, arguing
that two different terms in two different subsections must have
different meanings.98
In deciding that "reorganization" in § 1113 referred to the long-
term financial viability of the debtor, the court argued that a debtor,
concerned only with obtaining short-term relief, would look to §
1113(e), the interim relief subsection.' The court also looked to
§ 1129(a)(11) to justify its position. The court stated that § 1129
is concerned with confirming a reorganization plan that will not
result in liquidation or further financial reorganization. Therefore,
the concept of long-term viability of the debtor is inherent within
the reorganization process.) °
The court also held that the union had rejected the debtor's
proposal without good cause. 10' The basis for this holding was
that the union had not participated in any meaningful post-petition
9' Id. at 89.
96 Id. at 89-90.




1o1 Id. at 91.
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negotiations and had given no reason for rejecting the debtor's
proposal other than its view that the proposed modifications were
excessive. The court stated that the union must come forward with
a reason, supported by evidence, for its refusal to accept the
debtor's proposal or else it will be deemed to have refused the
proposal without good cause as per § 1113(2)(c). The court argued
that the good cause requirement was intended by Congress to
ensure that good faith negotiations would take place prior to court
involvement."°2 Because "the union had engaged in prehearing
stonewalling .. , it [could] not claim that it had good cause for
refusing the proposal.,
10 3
The Second Circuit noted that § 1113 codified the balancing of
the equities test of Bildisco.'O The court delineated six factors as
necessary to properly balance the equities involved in determining
whether a collective bargaining agreement should be rejected.
These six factors included:
(1)[T]he likelihood and consequences of liquidation if
rejection is not permitted; (2) the likely reduction in the
value of the creditors' claims if the bargaining agreement
remains in force; (3) the likelihood and consequences of a
strike if the bargaining agreement is voided; (4) the pos-
sibility and likely effect of any employee claims for breach
of the contract if rejection is approved; (5) the cost-
spreading abilities of the various parties, taking into account
the number of employees covered by the bargaining
agreement and how various employees' wages and benefits
compare to those of others in the industry; and, (6) the
good or bad faith of the parties in dealing with the debtor's
financial dilemma."
102 Id. at 92.
103 Id.
104 Id.
05 Id. at 93.
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The Second Court summarized its analysis with the following
statement:
In sum, we conclude that the necessity requirement [of §
1113] places on the debtor the burden of proving that its
proposal is made in good faith, and that it contains neces-
sary, but not absolutely minimal, changes that will enable
the debtor to complete the reorganization process success-
fully. 16
Rather than simply correct the deficiencies of the Supreme
Court's decision in Bildisco and create a clearly-understood
standard for the rejection of collective bargaining agreements by a
debtor in Chapter 11, Congress, in enacting § 1113, created a
statute fraught with ambiguity. Courts, like those in the Third and
Second Circuit, have been unable to construe the statute in a
uniform manner. Indeed, another split in the circuits has developed.
One mode of analysis views § 1113 as being very strict by only
allowing "essential" modifications which prevent the short-term
economic ruin and liquidation of the debtor. The counter mode of
analysis sees § 1113 as flexible, permitting proposals of any
necessary modifications that are made in good faith and that restore
the long-term financial viability of the debtor. 07
V. A POLICY ANALYSIS OF SECTION 1113: RECONCILING THE
BANKRUPTCY PROCESS WITH ECONOMIC REALITY THROUGH
UNDERSTANDING THE POWER OF DEBTOR COMPANY AND
UNION
Section 1113 must be reconciled in a manner that synchronizes
the policies behind the NLRA and the current Bankruptcy Code
" Id. at 90.
107 In 1990, the Tenth Circuit sided with the Second Circuit's flexible
interpretation; namely, that "necessary" does not require absolutely minimal
modifications and that the goal of Chapter 11 is to allow the debtor to complete
a successful reorganization, one that is economically viable in the long-term. In
re Mile Hi Metal Systems, Inc., 899 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1990).
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with the economic reality of the bargaining power between the
debtor company and the union. On its face, § 1113 is an ambigu-
ous, poorly-drafted statute which is susceptible to numerous
interpretations. Yet, § 1113 was enacted by Congress as a reaction
to the Supreme Court's decision in Bildisco.1°8 It was viewed at
passage as a pro-labor statute which would better accommodate the
differing interests of the bankruptcy act and the labor laws by
making rejection of collective bargaining agreements more
difficult. 1°9
Given the statute and the inherent tension involved in situations
where a debtor attempts to reject a collective bargaining agreement,
complex, costly and time-consuming litigation may ensue.110 Yet,
as one commentator has written, "[c]ourts clearly do not settle
labor disputes by judicial process. Labor negotiations occur at the
bargaining table."' Bankruptcy courts need to realize that, even
though they may reject a collective bargaining agreement, the
relationship between labor and the debtor company continues.
Therefore, rather than exacerbate a tense situation, bankruptcy
courts need to use their equitable powers to encourage the parties
to engage in good faith negotiations in order to achieve a mutually
108 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
109 In re Mile High Metal Systems, Inc., 899 F.2d at 895-97 (discussion of
legislative history) (Seymour C.J., concurring); In re Royal Composing Room,
848 F.2d 345, 352-354 (1988) (discussion of legislative history) (Feinberg C.J.,
dissenting).
110 Cosetti, supra note 48, at 183.
"'1Id. at 208. See also In re Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corporation, 50 B.R.
969 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985) where the court stated the following:
The parties recognize that this is a collective bargaining dispute and that
this court, as a place for resolving a collective bargaining dispute, is not
the proper forum.
The real decisions must be made at the bargaining table.
Id. at 984.
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acceptable resolution of the dispute at issue."'
While it appears that the policies of labor law and bankruptcy
law are at odds with each other, their underlying policies and goals
are similar:
The labor laws, of course, stress the maintenance of
industrial peace through free collective bargaining and
through adherence to the terms and conditions arrived at by
the parties in their negotiations for the duration of their
collective-bargaining agreement.
Chapter 11 properly understood has a parallel aim,
the development of an agreed on plan of reorganization that
will make a financially distressed company a productive
economic entity."'
Therefore, any interpretation of § 1113 should encourage good faith
negotiations and promote consensual resolutions of labor disputes.
The Second Circuit's Carey decision is more apt to promote
bargaining and consensual resolution of the situation than the Third
Circuit's Wheeling-Pittsburgh decision. The Third Circuit's reliance
upon only the "essential" modifications to ensure that the debtor is
prevented from liquidation does not promote legitimate bargaining
and does not allow the debtor to successfully reorganize its
company." 4 Meaningful negotiations between debtor company
and union can only occur if the "necessity" requirement is inter-
preted in a manner similar to that of the Carey court." 5
Yet, the courts need to better accommodate the requirements of
112 Cosetti, supra note 48, at 226.
113 130 Cong. Rec. 6181 (daily ed. May 22, 1984) (statement of Senator
Packwood). See also Cuevas, supra note 11, at 138-39 (arguing that both the
Bankruptcy Code and the NLRA seek to promote negotiations and resolution of
disputes through a bargaining process); Cosetti, supra note 48, at 224 ("[tlor all
creditors, voluntary negotiations is the essence of the chapter 11 plan process.").
114 Nichols, supra note 11, at 1003.
15 Id. at 1005.
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the NLRA in the bankruptcy context. Section 1113(b)(2) obligates
a debtor to "meet, at reasonable times, with the [employees']
authorized representative [and] to confer in good faith in attempting
to reach mutually satisfactory moditications of [the collective
bargaining] agreement. ' 116 The phrases "meet, at reasonable
times" and "confer in good faith" are identical to the language used
in § 8(d) of the NLRA, which defines the duties of the employer
and the employees' authorized representative to bargain in good
faith." 7 Therefore, Congress intended that the parties' duties to
bargain in good faith should be interpreted and applied in the same
manner as those duties are defined in the NLRA.118 Thus, the
courts should apply the NLRA's duty to bargain in good faith
standard to evaluate if the debtor or the union have negotiated in
good faith. If a party has not engaged in good faith negotiations,
the court should strongly consider that factor in making its
determination as to whether a collective bargaining agreement
should be rejected.'19
Even though not capable of precise definition, the duty to
bargain in good faith involves an "'obligation . . . to participate
actively in the deliberations so as to indicate a present intention to
find a basis for agreement. . . .' This implies both 'an open mind
and a sincere effort . . . to reach an agreement' as well as 'a
116 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2) (1988).
117 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). The employer's and the union's duty to
bargain collectively are mentioned at § 8(a)(5) and § 8(b)(3), respectively, of the
NLRA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) and (b)(3) (1988).
1l8 See Martha S. West, Life after Bildisco: Section 1113 and the Duty to
Bargain in Good Faith, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 123 (1986).
119 For example, if the debtor company has not fulfilled its duty to bargain
in good faith with the union or if both parties have not negotiated in good faith,
the court should deny the debtor's petition seeking rejection of the collective
bargaining agreement. Similarly, if the union has not engaged in good faith
negotiations but the debtor company has done so, the court should allow rejection
of the collective bargaining agreement as long as the debtor has also met all of
the other obligations under § 1113.
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sincere effort ... to reach a common ground.' '' 120 It is discerned
from the totality of conduct by each party. 2 ' It requires an
evaluation of a number of factors; such as, "frequency and duration
of meetings, exchange or lack of exchange of counteroffers,
repetitious offering of clearly unacceptable proposals, and inability
to reach agreement on any significant issue.W22 The duty to
bargain in good faith also includes a broad duty to furnish
information, especially when such proof is needed to verify the
accuracy of an argument. The inability to pay a certain wage rate
is a good example of when this proof is necessary.
123
The bankruptcy courts should develop the expertise to deter-
mine whether the debtor and/or the union have fulfilled their good
120 See CHARLES J. MORRIS ET AL.,THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 2D ED.
571 (1983) (quoting NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th
Cir. 1943)) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter LABOR LAW]. See also West, supra
note 118, at 69-70. The bankruptcy court in Matter of Walway, Co. defined good
faith bargaining as "conduct indicating an honest purpose to arrive at an
agreement as the result of the bargaining process." 69 B.R. at 973.
The concept of good faith bargaining is extremely complex and highly fact-
specific. Cases discussing the concept are endless. The purpose of this paper is
not to interpret the good faith bargaining standard in any great detail. An
excellent summary of the determination of good faith bargaining can be found
in LABOR LAW, at 570-606.
121 Id. at 571-72.
122 West, supra note 118, at 70.
123 The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956),
stated:
Good-faith bargaining requires that claims made by either bargainer
should be honest claims.... If... an argument is important enough
to present in the give and take of bargaining, it is important enough to
require some sort of proof of its accuracy.
Id. at 152-53. The duty to furnish information is mentioned in § 1113(b)(1)(B)
as a duty to "provide ... relevant information ... necessary to evaluate the
proposal." 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(B) (1988). A list of articles discussing the
duty to furnish information is detailed in LABOR LAW, supra note 120, at 607
n.348.
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faith bargaining obligations. Such a determination, while not
simple, is not beyond the capacity of a bankruptcy court judge and
is required by statute. It involves reaching a legal conclusion based
on the facts of the case.'24 If the judge does not feel competent,
a special master with labor law expertise can be appointed to make
a recommendation to the judge. Alternatively, if either party does
not have confidence in the bankruptcy judge, they can request that
the district court rule on the rejection issue as per § 157 (d) of the
Bankruptcy Code.'25
Even if the court determines that rejection of the current
collective bargaining agreement is warranted, the debtor must still
abide by its NLRA obligations and "bargain in good faith under
NLRA § 8(a)(5) over the terms and conditions of a possible new
contract.,1 26 Obligations under the NLRA are not suspended by
the filing of a Chapter 11 petition. Under the NLRA, the duty to
bargain in good faith continues as long as a relationship between
the employer and union exists. The debtor cannot just institute any
unilateral changes after rejection is approved. 127 The debtor must
bargain to impasse before making any unilateral changes involving
124 West, supra note 118, at 124-25.
125 Section 157(d) states:
The district court shall, on timely motion of a party, so withdraw a
proceeding if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding
requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United
States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate com-
merce.
29 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1988). See West, supra note 118, at 125 n.256.
126 Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 534. West, supra note 118, at 91-92.
127 Yet, some decisions have implied that a rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement does allow the debtor company to immediately institute
changes in the conditions of employment without engaging in further bargaining.
See, e.g., In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 B.R. 835, 841-42 (Bankr. Wyo.
1985); In re Allied Delivery Systems, 49 B.R. at 704.
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mandatory subjects in the collective bargaining agreement. 128 In
most instances, a debtor in Chapter 11 who wants to reject its
current collective bargaining agreement with the union does so
because it wants to alter the "wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment," mandatory subjects of bargaining.
Therefore, the bankruptcy courts should not allow any unilateral
changes in the collective bargaining agreement unless it is agreed
to by both parties or unless the debtor and the union have bar-
gained to impasse.
Bargaining to impasse should not take a lengthy period of time
because the emergency context of the Chapter 11 situation should
provide the debtor with an incentive to negotiate with the union on
an expedited basis.'29 Yet, this requirement would also recognize
the legitimate role of the union in representing the employees
before the debtor company, place greater pressure on the employer
to bargain in a serious manner with the union, allow the parties to
work more diligently towards an agreement involving mutually
satisfactory modifications, and allow the union to more actively
participate in the reorganization process. It would also better
accommodate the role of the NLRA within the bankruptcy process
by preserving a more just bargaining relationship between the
debtor and union: 13°
If the employer has not bargained in good faith by the time
of the rejection hearing, or if the parties have not yet
reached impasse, the court could continue the hearing for
128 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). Mandatory bargaining subjects
include those dealing with "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). See NLRB v. Wooster Division of
Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (where the Supreme Court distinguished
between mandatory and nonmandatory subjects of bargaining while holding that
insistence on bargaining over nonmandatory subjects violates the duty to bargain
in good faith).
129 West, sup-a note 118, at 124. The author cites numerous cases in which
impasse was reached in two to three meetings. Id. at 124 n.251.
'" Id. at 103-04, 125.
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another two or three weeks, giving the parties another
chance to reach agreement. If no agreement has been
reached by thirty days after the initial hearing date, then,
but only then, is the court required to rule on the rejection
application [as per § 1113(d)(2)]. Every effort should be
made to assist the parties in negotiating a modified contract.
Reaching an agreement will not only avoid rejection, but
will also serve the goal of successful reorganization. The
debtor's financial situation will be stabilized, and the parties
will not have to spend time negotiating an entirely new
contract. Furthermore, a negotiated compromise will insure
that no strike will occur upon rejection. 3'
Therefore, bankruptcy courts should apply § 1113 in a manner
which is consistent with the provisions of the NLRA. If the debtor
and union cannot reach a mutually acceptable agreement so that §
1113 must be employed, the Second Circuit's Carey approach is
preferable. Yet, the courts must be more attentive to balancing the
equities by more carefully utilizing the six factor approach
delineated in the Carey opinion.132
The first factor, the likelihood and consequences of liquidation
if rejection is not permitted, involves a comparison of the costs of
operating the business under the current collective bargaining
agreement with the costs of operating the business without the
agreement or with the debtor's proposed modifications which the
debtor will attempt to implement if rejection is approved.'33
Rejection of the collective bargaining agreement will, in most
instances, decrease the chances of liquidation because it will lower
employment costs. Yet, the question should be whether liquidation
will be avoided if rejection occurs. If it is likely that liquidation
will occur even after rejection, then rejection should be denied
131 Id. at 126.
132 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text. Only one other decision,
In re Texas Sheet Metals, Inc., 90 B.R. 260 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988), explicitly
utilized the Carey six-factor approach in balancing the equities.
133 West, supra note 118, at 138.
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because the goal of reorganization will not be enhanced.'34
The second and fourth factors in the Carey balancing of the
equities test deal with the effect of rejection on various creditors'
and employee claims. Rejection of a collective bargaining agree-
ment constitutes a breach of contract with the breach occurring at
the date immediately before the Chapter 11 petition was filed.'35
Therefore, any employee claims for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement will become prepetition unsecured claims.
Such claims have low priority. In contrast, any claims, such as
wages, for services rendered after commencement of the bankrupt-
cy case are deemed administrative expenses and are entitled to first
or highest priority. '6The creditors and the employees are at odds
with each other. Rejection of the collective bargaining agreement
will most likely result in lower wages and benefits being paid to
the employees. This will increase the amount of money available
to the creditors compared with the amount that would have been
available if rejection would not have occurred. Creditors will be
more inclined to approve a reorganization plan if it favorably
impacts upon their claims. 3 7 Although rejection of the collective
bargaining agreement means a breach of contract which increases
the overall amount of total claims on the estate, the low priority of
a breach of contract claim means that the employees will, in
reality, receive little to nothing in payment.'38 Therefore, rejec-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement will enhance the value
of the creditors' claims and increase the amount, although not
necessarily the value, of the employee claims. As a result, these
two factors would favor rejection since it would aid reorganization.
With regard to the fifth Carey factor, the cost-spreading
abilities of the various parties, the "employees are much more
'
34 Id. at 139.
135 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) (1988).
136 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(1)(A); 507(a)(1) (1988).
137 West, supra note 118, at 140, 143.
"' Id. at 141.
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vulnerable as individuals to the possible loss of income than are
business creditors."' 39 Yet, if rejection of the collective bargain-
ing agreement would guarantee a successful reorganization so that
some or all jobs will be saved, then rejection might be seen as
beneficial because loss of some jobs and a portion of one's income
may be preferable to a loss of all employees' jobs.' 4 Therefore,
rejection would tend to disfavor employees due to their vulnerabili-
ty, unless a successful reorganization can guarantee employees their
jobs and those jobs would be better than all other alternatives.
The sixth factor, focusing on the good or bad faith of the
parties in dealing with the debtor's financial dilemma, is a
restatement of the duty of each party to negotiate and bargain with
each other in good faith.14' Obviously, if the debtor either does
not bargain in good faith with the union, or attempts to utilize the
Chapter 11 process solely to avoid its obligations under the
collective bargaining agreement or destroy the union, then this
factor would not favor rejection. Alternatively, if the union does
not engage in good faith negotiations in attempting to come to
grips with the debtor's precarious financial situation, then this
factor would tilt toward favoring rejection.
One area in which many courts dealing with the issue of
allowing rejection of collective bargaining agreements in Chapter
11 proceedings have been remiss is not giving appropriate weight
to the likelihood and consequences of a strike by a debtor's
employees, factor three of the Carey balancing of the equities
test.42 Because the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement
may lead to a strike, courts need to take that possibility and its
1'9 Id. at 142.
14Oid.
141 See supra notes 116-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
duty to bargain in good faith.
142 See Joshua L. Sheinkman, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments in Chapter 11 and the Probability of Strikes: Tipping the Balance of
Equities, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 513, 533 (1987).
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consequences into account. 43 Courts need to concentrate on this
factor more carefully as it may be the key element in determining
whether rejection of a collective bargaining agreement will help or
hinder a debtor's reorganization.
In analyzing the importance of the strike factor, courts should
concentrate on two major aspects: "1) the probability of a strike
occurring after rejection; and 2) the likelihood that such a strike
would impair reorganization."'" In appraising the probability of
a strike after rejection, the court should consider: (1) the responses
of employees of other companies in the same industry after their
labor contracts have been rejected; (2) the size and labor intensive-
ness of the company because larger and more labor intensive
companies are usually better organized and more prone to striking;
and (3) whether the company is in the transportation or trucking
industry or has been recently deregulated because such industries
are more prone to strikes.'45
Moreover, in evaluating the likelihood that a strike will impair
reorganization, the court should assess: 1) the financial resources
that the union can commit to maintain a strike; and 2) the ability
of an employer to recruit and retrain qualified strike replacement
workers."4 When the union is financially committed, like in the
1983 Continental Airlines situation, a steady supply of strikebreak-
ers can negate any deleterious effect a strike may have on reorgani-
zation. 47 Yet, if the union is strong and well-organized, like the
United Steelworkers of America in the Wheeling-Pittsburgh
situation, a rejection of a collective bargaining agreement can
precipitate a harmful strike." 4 Ultimately, the court's decision
143 Id. at 532.
4 Id. at 538.
145 Id. at 538-39.
146 Id. at 540.
147 Id. at 540. See also Cosetti, supra note 48, at 183.
148 id.
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comes down to an appraisal of the economic power of both sides,
the union and the debtor company, while also taking into account
the external environment. Unfortunately, most courts have, at best,
merely evaluated the possibility of a strike in a superficial and
shallow manner.
Courts need to be aware of their limited role in resolving labor
disputes. They need to realize that an inappropriate rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement will not resolve the situation, but,
rather, may precipitate a strike. That was exactly what the bank-
ruptcy court did in Wheeling-Pittsburgh.49 The judiciary needs
to realize that its involvement in a labor dispute and its use of §
1113 will not resolve the situation. Instead, it can have the opposite
effect by hardening positions and wasting valuable time and
resources.
150
When a company files a Chapter 11 reorganization petition, the
company and the union are in the best position to evaluate the
company, including its history, the reason that it got into trouble,
its chances for a successful reorganization, the amount of sacrifices
required by each party to successfully reorganize the business, the
fairness of the sacrifices required by each side to make the
reorganization successful, and any other relevant information. The
149 Sheinkman, stpra note 142, at 518. The article also details a number of
other situations where rejections or breaches of collective bargaining agreements
precipitated or exacerbated strikes by employees. Other examples mentioned in
the article include: Wilson Foods (1983), Continental Airlines (1983), Bohack
Corp. (1976), Briggs Transportation Company (1984) and IML Freight, Inc.
(1986, where rejection of a collective bargaining agreement by a bankruptcy
court precipitated a strike which forced the company into liquidation). Id. at
528-32. The Eastern Airlines and the Greyhound bankruptcies are two more
recent examples where strikes by employees have precipitated bankruptcy filings
and where the company has tried unsuccessfully to use the bankruptcy process
to its advantage to solve labor disputes. See Aaron Bernstein, Busting Unions
Can Backfire on the Bottom Line, Bus. WK., Mar. 18, 1991, at 108; ALPA
Leaders at Eastern Call Meeting Following Court Approval for Pay Cuts, DAILY
LAB. REP., Aug. 16, 1990, at All; Diane B. Beckham & Amy Boardman,
Learning from Lorenzo; Weil, Gotshal Steers Greyhound to Friendly Turf, LEGAL
TIMES, June 18, 1990, at 2.
150 Cosetti, supra note 48, at 221.
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company, by filing a Chapter 11 petition, has evaluated its situation
and has decided that a reorganization is possible and is preferable
to liquidation. The union has or will also engage in that evaluation.
It will need to determine whether it makes sense to attempt to work
with the debtor company in rehabilitating the company, whether
wage and benefit concessions are in its and the company's best
interests, or whether its employees, the company and the economy
are better off by having the company liquidated. The company and
the union are closest to the situation, probably have more inside
knowledge about the events that lead up to the Chapter 11 filing,
and are the parties that have to live with the consequences of their
decisions. Therefore, the court should step gingerly when involving
itself in any collective bargaining dispute, especially one involving
a distressed company.
The ultimate answer lies in the marketplace where the union
and the debtor company can use their economic power to negotiate
a resolution of their dispute. Courts are a poor substitute for the
marketplace and are not very good at approximating economic
reality. 1 ' A court can either consciously or unconsciously at-
tempt to artificially tip the balance of power to one side or the
other.152 Yet, this does not aid the situation. It will most likely
prolong the inevitable, as the parties realize that reliance on their
legal positions, rather than their economic positions, has not solved
their dispute.'53 Therefore, courts need to be aware of their place
and the need to adhere to the NLRA, as it has evolved in defining
the relationship between employer and labor organization in regards
to collective bargaining.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 226.
153 Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
As two commentators have written:
[L]abor is a unique creditor. Labor creditors are not
completely subject to a two-thirds majority vote and the
cram down provisions because of their strike power.
Rejection of the labor contract does not change the desig-
nated bargaining agent or unit. The union continues to exist
and is free to strike. An active and strong union will require
a new contract.
Further, rejection of the pre-petition labor contract
does not determine the actual economic provisions to be
adopted in the post-petition labor contracts. Most labor
contracts are limited to relatively short periods of time, such
as one, two, or three years. Success of the reorganized
enterprise offers new opportunities to renegotiate contracts
in the future. This is not the case for other creditors.
It should be obvious (but it has not been) that unless
a new labor agreement is negotiated, a strong labor organi-
zation will strike when their contract is rejected. In an
ongoing business, a strike is likely even if courts determine
by strict standards that rejection is appropriate. Strongly
represented employees are conditioned to work only when
a contract is in place. The Bankruptcy code does not
provide the court with unique ability to prevent such a
strike.
This may not be the condition when the union is
disorganized. A weak or disorganized union may be forced
to accede to rejection and to the debtor's proposal. Obvi-
ously, in these situations, the court should proceed carefully
so as to maintain the needed equity balance.... A union
that cannot maintain an effective strike as a last resort has
lost its ultimate bargaining weapon. 54
Proper application of § 1113 can adequately accommodate the
154 Id. at 222-23 (footnotes omitted).
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goals and policies of labor law and bankruptcy law. Both of these
comprehensive federal legal systems are based upon the need for
negotiations and consensual agreements.
Courts need to understand the limited role that they can play in
resolving labor disputes. Ultimately, the labor dispute must be
resolved in the marketplace where both parties, the debtor company
and the union, can use their economic and bargaining power to
effectuate a settlement. Therefore, courts should not interject
themselves into a labor dispute without recognizing and accounting
for each side's economic power, or attempting to tilt that balance
of power in favor of one side. If they do, the consequences may be
disastrous. The court's unenlightened interjection may lead to a
strike, the prolongation of the reorganization process or to liqui-
dation. In any event, it will increase the deadweight bankruptcy
costs to society.
Rather than attempt to use their power to reject a collective
bargaining agreement under § 1113, bankruptcy courts should
utilize their equitable powers to require good faith bargaining and
negotiations between labor and the debtor company, so that a
mutually acceptable agreement can be reached which is based on
each side's economic power.

